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ABSTRACT 
 This study estimates the government costs of federal crop insurance under the framework 
of the Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994.  The history of federal crop insurance is outlined to 
examine how MPCI has evolved.  The 1994 Act addressed two of the major problems of MPCI:  
low participation and additional disaster assistance.  Total government costs for the FCIC and 
MPCI are estimated to be more than $2 billion, on average, from 1996 to 2003, with half of this 
amount being in the form of premium subsidies paid by the government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ESTIMATING THE COSTS OF MPCI 
UNDER THE 1994 CROP INSURANCE REFORM ACT 
 
 
 Under the Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994, federal farm program provisions changed 
to make crop insurance mandatory for program participants (Black 1995).  Farmers in the federal 
farm programs must insure any insurable crop that constitutes at least 10 percent of the farm’s 
crop value (Harwood 1995).  This rule change will greatly increase participation in federal crop 
insurance.  Historically, participation in multiple peril crop insurance (MPCI) has never 
exceeded 45 percent of total eligible acres.  This figure should shift to around 80 percent under 
the new guidelines. 
 The 1994 Act also increased the premium subsidies for MPCI and created a new 
catastrophic coverage level that farmers can purchase for only a $50 fee per crop.  These 
program adjustments will radically affect the participation in and performance of MPCI.  As 
Congress now explores options for the 1996 Farm Bill, federal crop insurance will come under 
the microscope.  Questions have been raised about the size and role of federally subsidized farm 
insurance.  Alternatives such as revenue assurance, revenue insurance, and a dual yield/revenue 
insurance program have been put forth.  But how has the 1994 Act impacted MPCI?  This study 
examines this issue by estimating the government costs of MPCI under the 1994 Act. 
 
A Historical Review of FCIC and MPCI Performance*  
 In the midst of the Great Depression, the widespread droughts in 1934 and 1936 created 
the impetus for federal research into the idea of crop insurance.  By 1937, the USDA had 
determined that they had sufficient wheat yield data to provide an actuarial basis for wheat yield 
insurance.  With the passage of the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1938, the Federal Crop 
Insurance Corporation (FCIC) was established and federally-sponsored crop insurance was born.  
                                                          
* For a more detailed description of the history of crop insurance in America on which this brief summary is based, 
see Kramer 1988. 
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The crop insurance program began in 1939 with wheat as the only insurable crop.  Farmers could 
choose to insure 50 or 75 percent of a “recorded or appraised average yield.”  In its first year, the 
FCIC paid $1.52 in indemnities for every $1.00 of premiums, resulting in a loss ratio 
(indemnities/premiums) of 1.52.  Through the early 1940s, participation in the wheat yield 
insurance program grew steadily, though the program still remained rather small.  But the 
insurance performance over this period did not improve.  The original crop insurance plan was to 
be self-supporting, including administration and delivery costs, but it failed to be.  In 1942, 
federal crop insurance expanded to cover cotton (Kramer 1988). 
 Due to the large losses in every year of the crop insurance program and the low levels of 
participation, Congress moved to effectively end federal crop insurance under the Agricultural 
Appropriations Act of 1944.  However, later that year, an amendment added to the original 1938 
Act revived federal crop insurance, expanded the crop coverage to wheat, cotton, and flax as 
insurable crops and corn, soybeans, barley, and “any other agricultural commodity” for which 
sufficient data could be obtained as experimental insurance crops.  The amendment also allowed 
the FCIC to refuse to sell crop insurance in high risk areas and limited the offering of federal 
crop insurance to counties in which at least 50 farms or one-third of the farms that normally 
grow the insurable crop had applied for it.  An experimental crop insurance program is 
constrained to fewer than 20 counties and up to 3 years of coverage (Kramer 1988). 
 By 1947, corn and tobacco had progressed from experimental to regular status.  Also, in 
1947, the FCIC finally experienced a year in which total premiums exceeded total indemnities.  
However, from 1939 to 1947, the FCIC had incurred a net loss of $73 million.  County coverage 
was reduced from 2,500 to 375 and the minimum number of applying farms needed to secure 
federal crop insurance for a county was increased in a effort to reduce the excess indemnities.  
During the 1950s, MPCI performed on an actuarially sound basis while experimenting with 
several new crops and innovations such as multiple-crop contracts.  Soybeans and barley joined 
the regular insurable crops list.  By 1956, coverage had rebounded to 948 counties and 24 crops, 
some as experimental crops or included in multiple-crop contracts (Kramer 1988). 
 The success of MPCI in the 1950s led into its decline during the 1960s.  The FCIC 
moved aggressively to increase coverage across the country through lower premium rates, 
partially based upon previous successes.  Federal crop insurance performance steadily 
deteriorated as indemnities rose at a greater rate than premiums.  By 1970, this trend pressured 
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the FCIC to eliminate some experimental programs, increase premium rates for cotton, and make 
several adjustments to soybean policies (Kramer 1988). 
 Agriculture’s safety net was enlarged by the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 
1973.  This act created the disaster payment programs of the 1970s and 1980s.  More than $3 
billion was distributed in the form of disaster payments from 1974 to 1980.  Many thought this 
form of “free crop insurance”  undermined the FCIC effort.  Thus, with the passage of the 
Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980, federal crop insurance became the main form of disaster 
assistance.  The 1980 Act also removed the bounds on the expansion of MPCI coverage by crop 
and county and provided premium subsidies to spur participation in the insurance program.  To 
limit the impact of these changes on private crop insurers, rule changes were made so that 
farmers who insured against hail or fire with a private company could remove these provisions 
from their federal crop insurance policy and pay only 70 to 85 percent of their normal premium.  
Also, the delivery of MPCI was adjusted so private insurance companies could actively market 
and service any MPCI contract through master marketer or reinsurance plans (Kramer 1988).  
Private insurers could market MPCI previously, but only in limited areas (Goodwin and Smith 
1994).  The 1980 Act specified that all administration and delivery costs were to be paid by the 
federal government (Glauber, Harwood, and Skees 1993). 
 Many had urged the FCIC to “individualize” crop insurance policies in order to increase 
participation and reduce adverse selection problems.  In 1985, the FCIC switched the farmer’s 
average yield formulation to rely upon his/her Actual Production History (APH) in which the 
insurable yield is based upon the farmer’s historical yields, instead of county average yields 
(Kramer 1988; Goodwin and Smith 1994).  Loss ratios for MPCI continued to rise above what 
had been expected.  Under the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, 
Congress set guidelines for the FCIC to increase premiums to an actuarially sound level, but not 
by more than 20 percent per year (Glauber, Harwood, and Skees 1993).  Over the period 1980-
90, government outlays for MPCI exceeded $9.2 billion, indemnities were over $7.2 billion, and 
farmer-paid premiums only added up to $3.8 billion.  Only 17 percent of the acres eligible for 
MPCI enrolled, on average, over the 1980s (Goodwin 1994). 
 Overall, from 1939 to 1994, the FCIC paid more in indemnities than it received in 
premiums in 33 out of the 56 years (Goodwin and Smith 1994).  Since the 1980 Act, indemnities 
exceeded premiums 12 out of 14 years with an average loss ratio of 1.41.  Thus, the performance 
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of the FCIC and MPCI has been unfavorable at best.  The program resulted in significant budget 
outlays, yet failed to cover a vast majority of farmers. 
 
The Current Structure of Federal Crop Insurance 
 Significant changes have occurred in federal crop insurance due to the Crop Insurance 
Reform Act of 1994.  Farmers who wish to be eligible for price and income support payments, 
through federal farm programs, must enroll in a crop insurance plan.  A basic catastrophic 
coverage (50 percent of the yield guarantee at 60 percent of the price election) is available to 
farmers for a $50 fee per crop with total fees possibly faced by a farmer capped at $600.  There 
are more options to choose from in the percentages of yield guarantees and price elections 
covered.  Premium subsidies have been increased.  Also, the 1994 Act brought ad hoc disaster 
aid “on-budget,” meaning spending cuts would have to be made elsewhere in the federal budget 
to free money for disaster aid.  Before this, ad hoc disaster assistance was “off-budget” 
(Harwood 1995). 
 
Table 1.  Fees and premium subsidies for MPCI 
 
 
Coverage Level 
 
Processing Fee 
(paid by the farmer)
Government 
Premium 
Subsidy 
(% of yield 
guarantee/ 
 % of price election) 
 
(dollars) 
(% of the 
premium) 
50/60 50 100 
65/100 10 41.7 
75/100 10 23.5 
     Source:  Black 1995. 
 
 Table 1 presents the fee and premium subsidy structure for federal crop insurance under 
the 1994 Act.  Previously, premium subsidies had been set at up to 30 percent of the premium 
(Harwood 1995).  Thus, the 1994 Act has brought about a major change in premium subsidies. 
 These changes in federal farm policy included in the 1994 Act target two of the largest 
concerns about federal crop insurance:  the low participation rate and the need for ad hoc disaster 
assistance (Harwood 1995).  By requiring farmers who participate in federal farm programs to 
purchase some form of crop insurance, the crop insurance participation rate will rise 
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substantially.  Also, since most farmers will now have crop insurance, the likelihood of needing 
ad hoc disaster relief is decreased.  The catastrophic coverage and increased premium subsidies 
should also inspire more farmers to enroll in federal crop insurance.  By bringing ad hoc disaster 
relief “on-budget,” Congress will be forced to make hard choices in spending cuts to provide 
such assistance, thus making it less likely. 
 
The Empirical Data and Underlying Assumptions 
 Eight crops (barley, corn, oats, rice, sorghum, soybeans, upland cotton, and wheat) are 
examined in this study.  Historical 1981-94 state-level data on net insured acres, total premiums, 
government subsidies of premiums, losses paid, price election, and protection in force (the 
product of the price election, yield guarantee, and net insured acres, i.e., the maximum possible 
loss) are provided by the FCIC through Rain and Hail Insurance Services.  From these figures, 
historical loss ratios, per acre premiums, and yield guarantees are calculated.  Projected 1995-
2003 state-level figures for planted acres, complying base acres, farm program participation, 
yield, and farm price are computed from regional figures from the FAPRI baseline with variable 
weather. 
 It is assumed that yield insurance is mandatory for farm program participants, as under 
the Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994, and that nonparticipants in the farm program will 
employ yield insurance at the crop’s 1982-94 average MPCI participation rate.  The percentage 
of complying base acres planted to the program crop is assumed to be the same as in 1994.  
Projected net insured acres equal the sum of farm program planted acres and non-program 
planted acres with MPCI.  Since soybeans is not a farm program crop but is often planted by 
farmers who participate in the federal farm program, the yield insurance participation rate for 
soybeans is taken to be the same as the participation rate for corn. 
 The price election is computed as the sum of the farm price and the 1981-94 average 
difference between the price election and the farm price.  The yield guarantee is set at 65 percent 
of the 10-year average yield; thus, we have assumed 65 percent yield insurance, which has been 
the most popular MPCI package over the 1980s and early 1990s (GAO 1991).  The government 
subsidy of the premium covers 41.7 percent of the premium.  This rate is the 1995 premium 
subsidy rate for 65 percent yield insurance (Black 1995). 
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 Due to data limitations and the drive in the early 1990s to bring federal yield insurance to 
better actuarial performance, we only use historical loss ratios (HLRs) over the previous 10 years 
to update premium rates.  The per acre premium updating structure is given by: 
 
 Premium
0.95* Premium    if               HLR  0.70
Premium             if   0.70  HLR  1.11
1.05* Premium    if   1.11  HLR  1.25
1.10* Premium    if   1.25  HLR  1.75
1.125* Premium  if   1.75  HLR  2.05
1.15* Premium    if   2.05  HLR  2.51
1.20* Premium    if   2.51  HLR
 .t+1
t t+1
t t+1
t t+1
t t+1
t t+1
t t+1
t t+1
=
<≤ <≤ <≤ <≤ <≤ <≤










 
 
Thus, the premium structure follows the restriction, under the 1990 Farm Bill, that the FCIC can 
make premiums actuarially sound by raising rates, but not by more than 20 percent per year 
(Glauber, Harwood, and Skees 1993).  Administration costs for the FCIC are set at $100 million 
per year.  Delivery costs, reimbursements to private insurance companies, and processing fees 
paid by farmers are not included in this analysis. 
 Yields are assumed to be normally distributed across a state.  The mean yield is given by 
the state-level actual yield.  The standard deviation for yields is set at a multiple of the state-level 
yield standard deviation given by county-level yields.  To simulate farm-level yield variability 
and to adequately capture past yield insurance performance, the multiplier is set so actual and 
simulated yield insurance performance are equivalent over the 1982-89 period.  To parallel the 
weather pattern underlying the FAPRI projections, the yield variability over the 1980s is used in 
the projection period (1996-2003).  The rice yield variability is also weighted by the average 
growth in yields over the projection period versus over the 1980s.  Yields are also taken to be 
non-negative.  Thus, yields have a truncated normal distribution across a state in this analysis.  
The percentage of acres with losses is computed as the probability of being below the yield 
guarantee given the yield distribution.  The average yield of acres with losses is computed as the 
mean of the distribution given by the yield distribution when truncated from below at zero and 
above at the yield guarantee. 
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MPCI Cost and Premium Estimates 
 The effects of increased participation in MPCI and higher premium rates due to a need 
for actuarially better performance can be seen in Table 2.  MPCI participation jumps from an 
average of 24 percent from 1982 to 1994 to 86.5 percent for 1996 to 2003.  Per acre total 
premiums increase for every crop.  Soybean has the smallest increase, while cotton, rice, and oat 
per acre total premiums nearly double in size.  Per acre farmer premiums also increase for every 
crop, inspite of the larger premium subsidies.  Again, soybean has the smallest increase at $0.03 
more per acre and cotton has the largest increase at more than $8 per acre, on average.  Overall, 
per acre total premiums increase by $3.83 and per acre farmer premiums increase by $1.37. 
 
Table 2.  Average 1982-94 and 1996-2003 insured acres and per acre premiums 
 1996-2003 Average 1982-94 Average 
 
 
Crop 
 
Eligible 
Acres 
Net 
Insured 
Acres 
Per Acre 
Total 
Premiu
m 
Per Acre 
Farmer 
Premium 
 
Eligibl
e 
Acres 
Net 
Insured 
Acres 
Per Acre 
Total 
Premium 
Per Acre 
Farmer 
Premium 
 (mill.) (mill.) ($/acre) ($/acre) (mill.) (mill.) ($/acre) ($/acre) 
Barley    5.44    4.43  8.01  4.67    5.79   2.42   4.87   3.41 
Corn  80.83  65.53 11.23  6.55  74.42 17.04   8.63   6.04 
Cotton  12.68  12.08 36.24 21.13  10.05   3.06 18.37 12.86 
Oats    4.88    1.57  7.53  4.39    9.51   0.71   4.07   2.85 
Rice    3.50    3.49 15.59  9.09    2.80   0.37   7.55   5.28 
Sorghum  11.32    7.92 11.41  6.65  13.08   2.45   6.47   4.53 
Soybeans  63.09  50.34  9.13  5.32  60.71 12.83   7.56   5.29 
Wheat  74.11  75.94  8.38  4.88  73.80 21.99   5.02   3.51 
Total 255.85 221.30 11.12  6.48 250.16 60.87   7.29   5.11 
 
 The actuarial performance of MPCI is given in Table 3.  With the higher participation 
and premiums, average total premiums rise from $444 million in 1982-94 to $2.46 billion in 
1996-2003, a nearly sixfold increase.  Average total indemnities move from $620 million in 
1982-94 to $2.99 billion in 1996-2003, a fivefold increase.  Since premiums increase more than 
indemnities, the overall loss ratio for MPCI improves from 1.40 to 1.21.  Loss ratio 
improvements are seen in all of the crops, except corn. 
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Table 3.  Average 1982-94 and 1996-2003 total premiums, total indemnities, and loss ratios 
 1996-2003 Average  1982-94 Average 
Crop Total 
Premiums 
Total 
Indemnities 
Loss 
Ratio 
 Total 
Premiums 
Total 
Indemnities 
Loss 
Ratio 
 ($ mill.) ($ mill.)   ($ mill.) ($ mill.)  
Barley     35.47     56.78 1.60    14.77   20.86 1.77 
Corn   736.09   912.56 1.24  147.07 163.89 1.11 
Cotton   437.69   475.82 1.09    56.21   87.12 1.55 
Oats     11.86     16.06 1.35      2.91     4.66 1.60 
Rice     54.40     72.50 1.33      2.82     7.98 2.83 
Sorghum     90.37   114.34 1.27    15.82   25.06 1.58 
Soybeans   459.35   567.00 1.23    97.02 136.76 1.41 
Wheat   636.14   772.78 1.21  110.38 174.12 1.58 
Total 2461.37 2987.84 1.21  444.00 620.44 1.40 
 
 
Table 4.  Comparison of 1996-2003 average premiums with 1994 premiums 
  1996-2003 Average  1994 
  Per Acre Premiums  Per Acre Premiums 
Crop State Total Farmer  Total Farmer 
  ($/acre) ($/acre)  ($/acre) ($/acre) 
Corn Illinois 11.67   6.80    9.80   6.86 
Corn Iowa   9.32   5.44    8.56   5.99 
Cotton Arkansas 42.00 24.49  14.57 10.20 
Cotton North 
Carolina 
16.05   9.36  17.67 12.37 
Rice Arkansas 18.45 10.76    8.82   6.17 
Rice California   5.67   3.30    7.46   5.22 
Rice Texas   8.58   5.00    7.55   5.29 
Soybeans Arkansas 20.30 11.84  10.84   7.59 
Soybeans Illinois   7.16   4.17    6.05   4.24 
Soybeans Iowa   4.93   2.88    5.32   3.72 
Wheat Kansas   7.06   4.12    4.80   3.36 
Wheat North Dakota   6.40   3.73    4.62   3.23 
 
 State-level impacts differ greatly due to the diverse yield distributions and past MPCI 
performance in the states.  Table 4 compares the average 1996-2003 per acre premiums to the 
1994 per acre premiums.  For state-crop combinations where MPCI had performed well in the 
past, such as North Carolina cotton, California rice, and Iowa soybeans, both per acre total and 
farmer premiums fall.  Other state-crop combinations, such as Texas rice, Illinois soybeans, and 
Illinois and Iowa corn, have per acre total premiums rising; but per acre farmer premiums 
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decrease due to the larger premium subsidies.  For state-crop combinations where MPCI had 
performed poorly in the past, the goal of actuarial soundness drives both sets of premiums up.  In 
some cases, such as Arkansas cotton, rice, and soybeans, per acre premiums are two to three 
times the 1994 levels. 
 
Table 5.  1996-2003 average federal crop insurance government costs and its components 
 
 
Crop 
  
Excess 
Losses 
 Government 
Subsidies of 
Premiums 
 Total 
Government 
 Costs 
  ($ mill.)  ($ mill.)  ($ mill.) 
Barley    21.32      14.79      39.41 
Corn  176.46    306.95    737.03 
Cotton    38.13    182.51    294.75 
Oats      4.20        4.95      10.06 
Rice    18.10      22.68      43.31 
Sorghum    23.96      37.69      73.41 
Soybeans  107.65    191.55    389.12 
Wheat  136.64    265.27    464.85 
Total  526.47  1026.39  2051.95 
 
 Table 5 displays average 1996-2003 average government costs for the FCIC and MPCI.  
Excess losses, i.e., indemnities over and above premiums, add up to more than $500 million with 
nearly 80 percent of this coming from corn, wheat, and soybeans.  From 1982 to 1994, 
government subsidies of MPCI premiums averaged $112 million.  With the increased 
participation in MPCI and the higher premium subsidies, this figure leaps to over $1 billion for 
1996 to 2003, making this category one-half of the average total government outlays for the 
FCIC and MPCI.  Average 1996-2003 total government costs for federal crop insurance is $2 
billion.  These costs vary greatly from year to year.  Under the weather pattern used here, total 
government costs ranged from just over $1 billion in 1996 to $4 billion in 2002.  Thus, the 
expanded crop insurance program may create significant budgeting problems in the future. 
 
Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 This paper examines the past, present, and future of federal crop insurance.  Though 
federal crop insurance has mainly been an “experimental” program for much of its life, its role 
has been greatly expanded since the Crop Insurance Act of 1980.  With the crop insurance 
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participation provisions in federal farm programs in place, a vast majority of the nation’s farmers 
will be covered by MPCI.  Increasing budgetary pressure will force the FCIC to make more 
forceful attempts to bring MPCI to a more acceptable actuarial performance level.  The 1996 
Farm Bill will set the structure of agriculture’s safety net for the 21st century.  MPCI will be 
compared to several other safety net options, such as revenue assurance and a dual yield/revenue 
insurance program. 
 Under the various assumptions employed in this study, the government costs and 
premiums of MPCI are estimated for 1996 to 2003.  In comparing the projected 1996-2003 
averages to 1982-94 averages, MPCI participation leaps from 24 to 86.5 percent of eligible 
acres; per acre premiums rise across the board; total premiums increase nearly sixfold; total 
indemnities increase fivefold; and the overall loss ratio falls from 1.40 to 1.21.  Thus, MPCI’s 
actuarial performance improves. 
 In looking at the various state-level impacts, we find that the increased participation, 
higher premium subsidies, and stepped-up actuarial performance have very different effects 
depending on the state and the crop.  For some state-crop combinations, both total and farmer per 
acre premiums decline in the projection period.  Other state-crop combinations encounter higher 
total per acre premiums, but lower farmer per acre premiums due to the increased subsidies.  Still 
other state-crop combinations, where MPCI has performed poorly, face significantly higher 
premiums. 
 In total, average 1996-2003 government costs for the FCIC and MPCI are over $2 billion.  
Half of this amount originates from the government subsidies of the crop insurance premiums.  
The total government costs also varies a great deal from year to year.  Under this projection, 
costs ranged from $1 to $4 billion.  Thus, when the 1996 Farm Bill debate focuses on 
agriculture’s safety net, the questions become:  (1) Does the increased participation in and 
expected improved performance of MPCI justify the substantial budgetary allocation?  (2) Can 
the agriculture budget handle such a wide ranging cost for a program?  and (3) Is there another 
package that can provide farmers the stability they need at a lower cost?. 
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